PROMOTING AN ETHICAL ORGANIZATIONAL
CULTURE
Maurice Stucke *
Even its more stalwart defenders are concerned that capitalism is
in crisis. 1 The crisis in capitalism might have come as a shock to some,
but not to many middle- and lower-income households. Well before
2008, middle-class Americans saw little gains in income, despite gains in
productivity.
After the economic crisis, there has been a significant erosion of
trust. For seventeen years, the Edelman Trust Barometer has surveyed
over 33,000 people across twenty-eight countries about their level of
trust. 2 Its 2017 survey revealed what many already suspect: “trust is in
crisis around the world.” 3 Trust in four key institutions—businesses,
governments, non-governmental organizations, and media—has declined
broadly, “a phenomenon not reported since Edelman began tracking
trust among this segment in 2012.” 4 The biggest declines in trust were in
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the United States, followed by the United Kingdom and France. Besides
a loss in trust, most people, including many wealthy and upper middleclass, believe that the system is not working. 5 Sixty-nine percent were
concerned about widespread corruption. 6 Only thirty-seven percent
viewed CEOs as credible, an all-time low in the survey. 7
So why the loss in trust? One major factor is the rise of unethical
and illegal behavior. Ethical business practices, as many in the 2017
Edelman Trust Barometer survey identified, are important ways to build
trust in a company. 8 But few thought companies were performing well
on the attributes of integrity or ethical business practices. 9 Unethical and
illegal corporate conduct remains pervasive. The economic crisis heightened concerns of widespread unethical and illegal conduct among financial institutions.
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Paradoxically, the decrease in trust and increase in corporate
crime have been accompanied by the growth in corporate compliance
12

over the past twenty years. Companies are investing more in compliance. 13 The Ethics and Compliance Officer Association, for example,
grew between 1992 and 2012 from nineteen members to over 1,200
members “exclusively comprised of in-house compliance/ethics profes14

sionals.” Likewise, the Society of Corporate Compliance and Ethics,
which certifies compliance/ethics professionals, has over 5,800 members
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comprised of both in-house and outside compliance/ethics practitioners. 15
Policymakers are also seeking to incentivize companies to better
comply with the law and develop an ethical organizational culture. Some
statutes, for example, require public firms to disclose their compliance
16

efforts. For over twenty-five years the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s
Organizational Guidelines (“Organizational Guidelines”) provide firms
strong financial incentives to develop an ethical organizational culture.
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that goal.” 18 Most employees surveyed “see the need for and have positive views of ethics and compliance training, but far fewer find it applicable and believe they learned something new during their training.” 19
Given the crisis in trust, policymakers and companies should
start with humility. They should not assume that the current approach is
working (or will work). Instead pragmatism and experimentation are in
order. Policymakers must inquire how companies can promote an ethical
organizational culture. What steps should companies take? What can policymakers do to promote these efforts? Flowing from Professor Marcia
Weldon’s presentation, 20 my comments briefly outline four issues.
First, how many of you think you are an ethical, good citizen?
Now think of one or two reasons why you are an ethical, good citizen.
How many of you thought, “Because I obey the law”? Probably few, if
any. We expect more from ourselves than simply complying with the
law. Why then should we hold companies to that minimum? Thus, being an ethical and good corporate citizen entails more than simply complying with the law. We expect companies to comply with the law, but
that, by itself, is not sufficient to promote an ethical organizational culture. More is required than compliance training.
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Second, if you were paid to attend religious services, would you
become more ethical? Most of us would likely say no. So, should we expect extrinsic financial rewards to promote an ethical organizational culture? Currently, the Organizational Guidelines offer a significant discount off a corporate fine for companies with effective ethics and compliance programs. If a qualifying company is later convicted of a crime,
the federal court, in following the Organizational Guidelines, would lower its culpability score by three points, thereby significantly reducing the
organization’s criminal fine.
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The idea of an incentive came up when the Sentencing Commission deliberated over how to sentence organizations. The Commission
sought advice from experienced white-collar attorneys. The attorneys
raised the incentive, in recommending “a very flexible set of non-binding
‘policy statements’ that called for substantial fine reductions if the organization had instituted an effective compliance program to prevent law
violations and otherwise acted responsibly.” 23 (The Department of Justice, in contrast, proposed a “modest” discount for an effective compliance program. 24) The Commission staff thought “that organizations
could be induced to behave legally and responsibly by, in effect, ‘offering’ them the promise of substantial fine reductions if the entity had instituted effective measures to prevent and detect violations (i.e., the violation occurred in spite of reasonable preventive efforts and was promptly reported and addressed).” 25 But if the organization acted “‘negligently’
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with regard to its legal risks, its punishment upon conviction would be
much greater.” 26 As its Vice Chair stated, the Sentencing Commission
hoped that organizations would come to
view this guideline scheme as a powerful
financial reason for instituting effective
internal compliance programs that, in
turn, would minimize the likelihood that
the organization would run afoul of the
law in the first instance. And, if and when
a corporate crime was committed, perhaps through the actions of a rogue, lower level employee, the sentencing guideline incentives would drive the corporate
actor toward swift and effective disclosure
and other remedial actions. Although
those immediate objectives were bold advances in their own right, the Commission’s vision for its organizational guideline structure was even more ambitious
and forwarding-looking. The Commission
hoped this punishment scheme initiative
would help contribute, over time, to a
more healthy, values-based way of doing
business in America. 27
When my wife Elizabeth and I began our research, we thought
the federal courts might be dispensing this incentive like candy on Halloween. What amazed us was how infrequently—less than 0.0873 percent of organizations sentenced—the federal courts found the defendant’s ethics and compliance efforts to be effective. 28 So our research ex26
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amined whether extrinsic financial rewards can promote an ethical organizational culture. To preview our research, we’ll use our youngest daughter’s response. Before we headed to a compliance industry conference,
our youngest daughter asked about our topic. We replied: “Whether extrinsic financial rewards were effective in promoting an ethical organizational culture.” She looked at us dumbfounded. So, we tried another
route. “Let’s say we were to pay you to read books. Would that foster a
love of reading?” As she was an avid reader, the question, we thought,
was rhetorical. She thought for a minute, and said, “Yes, it would. What
if I read two shorter books? Is that the same as reading one longer book?
If I read a kindergarten book, does that count the same as if I read Moby
Dick?” Her response resembles our findings: companies will ask the
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) what they will need to do to get the extrinsic reward. And
that has fundamental problems, as a checklist approach does not promote an ethical organizational culture.
The third issue is what can the agencies do to promote an ethical
organizational culture? The SEC and DOJ cannot tell companies specifically how to promote an ethical organizational culture. Nor should they
tout the Organizational Guidelines’ extrinsic reward. The available information—economic logic, sentencing data, behavioral insights, survey
results, and (most importantly) the persistence of significant corporate
crime—indicates that the current extrinsic, incentive-based approach to
compliance is ineffective. An extrinsic, incentive-based approach can actually encumber an ethical organizational culture. So, if the current approach is not working, what will work? We advance an intrinsic, ethicsbased approach to compliance. Here, the expectation is that a firm seeks
an ethical organizational culture for its own end or for a strategic competitive advantage. An intrinsic, ethics-based approach is already in the
Organizational Guidelines but is de-emphasized. As we’ll explore in our
forthcoming book, it should be given greater emphasis by policymakers
and enforcers.
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A fourth issue is the intersection between artificial intelligence
and ethics. We are seeing this issue as firms shift toward pricing algorithms. 29 What happens when these pricing algorithms can reach the
same anticompetitive outcome as when executives fix prices in a smokefilled hotel room? What are the executives’ obligations when their algorithms independently learn the optimal strategy of tacitly colluding?
Should we hold executives accountable for the behavior of their algorithms? If so, under what circumstances and what legal standard should
be employed? This is an open field currently.
So, my aim here is to identify the underlying problem: why, despite the great interest by policymakers (and often the companies themselves), haven’t more firms developed an ethical organizational culture?
Firms have many independent reasons to prevent and detect criminal
conduct and promote an organizational culture that encourages ethical
conduct and a commitment to comply with the law. Nonetheless, many
firms’ efforts remain ineffective, and corporate crime persists.
The situation may appear bleak for policymakers. Neither market forces nor higher fines will yield an ethical organizational culture.
Nor will the Organizational Guidelines’ extrinsic, incentive-based approach likely promote an ethical organizational culture. Indeed, as we
have seen, the incentive-based approach is likely contributing to the persistence of ineffective compliance.
So, if the Organizational Guidelines’ current approach is not
working, the debate turns to what should policymakers do next. An alternative approach—an intrinsic, ethics-based approach toward compliance—exists, is gaining traction in the compliance industry, and should
be given greater emphasis by policymakers and companies.
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